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Zenker and Yu advocate extending the familiar dichotomous epistemic versus deontic
division of authorities into a fourfold division, adding attractive and being a majority (group
majority) as two further forms of authority. Their proposal immediately raises two critical
questions:
1. Why do Zenker and Yu think that these two additional sources should be recognized?
2. Are Zenker and Yu’s reasons sufficient to justify their fourfold typology?
In Section 1, the authors refer to a reason why the epistemic/deontic division needs to be
extended: It ignores “important insights gleaned from Aristotle, Cicero, Boethius, and Locke” (p.
2). They discuss these sources in the course of their paper.
Zenker and Yu first consider Goodwin’s proposal to distinguish epistemic, deontic, and
dignity possessing sources. Although they reject dignity as an additional source, their discussion
of certain questions which Goodwin raises is germane to their argument. First, Goodwin asks for
criteria for distinguishing forms of authority. She sees three possible criteria–activity, capacity,
and response. Which of these three properly distinguishes epistemic from deontic authority?
Goodwin argues that it cannot be the activity criterion because performing some activities
successfully requires both sharing knowledge and giving direction. One teaching some skill
already has that skill at least to some degree and is in a position to give instruction, thus
requiring both knowledge and direction. One exercise of authority is both epistemic and deontic.
But why does a typology need to divide into mutually exclusive classes? Why does an instance
which falls under more than one type show the typology to be deficient?
Goodwin also argues that the criterion cannot be based on some capacity which having
knowledge or the right to direct involve. Some instances of authority apparently fall under
neither criterion. No matter how much knowledge one has acquired in a certain field, one is not
an authority if no one else recognizes one’s superior knowledge. Likewise, no matter what
authority some institution has granted some individual, if no one (other than the individual)
recognizes that the institution has bestowed these powers, does the person have deontic
authority? Goodwin objects. The criterion implies “having epistemic authority is derivative to
[sic] being recognized as such, which is counterintuitive” (p. 11, italics in original). Again, I am
not convinced. Do we rather have evidence that “authority” is ambiguous? In one sense, being an
epistemic authority is simply a matter of possessing a superior amount of knowledge in a certain
area. Having epistemic authority may be characterized with a subjunctive conditional: If one
were to ask the authority a question in the area, the authority would give a competent answer
(ceteris paribus). But if no one else knows that fact, would anyone turn to that individual for
knowledge about that area? Would a person be an authority in a second sense indicating capacity
to be in and enter into certain relations with others? But in the second sense, being recognized as

an epistemic authority is a necessary condition for having such authority. Is this sense
counterintuitive?
Finding the capacity criterion deficient, Goodwin turns to the response-based principle to
distinguish epistemic from deontic authority. “The response-based principle distinguishes
authority types ‘by the reaction to failure to follow [an instance of that type] ordinarily evokes’”
(J. L. Austin, “A Plea for Excuses,” quoted on p. 11, italics in original). To fail to respect an
epistemic authority is imprudent, while failure to follow a deontic authority is disobedient. Is this
criterion mutually exclusive as Goodwin requires? If a drill sergeant gives an order to turn right
and a soldier turns left, the drill sergeant is not going to be very happy with this disobedience.
There will be consequences. However, it is not obvious to me that such behavior is just
disobedient. It is also imprudent, given its negative consequences. So it is not obvious to me that
the response- based criterion successfully separates exclusively epistemic authority from deontic
authority in all cases. But let us move on.
Goodwin argues that the response-based principle allows recognizing a third type of
authority–dignity. One who disregards the authority of dignity is impudent. One is reminded here
that the argumentum ad verecundiam label originally meant not an appeal to an authority outside
his or her field of expertise but a charge that not to accept the word of some recognized authority
betrays a lack of modesty. How dare one question the word of that authority? I do not see that
Zenker and Yu have given any example or other explication of what failure to recognize the
authority of dignity amounts to. But if someone questions a senior individual, is that person
necessarily being impudent? Does it not depend on how the challenge is phrased, e.g., “with all
due respect” or whether the challenger is prepared to justify that challenge with good reasons?
Does being asserted by a senior individual endow an assertion with some rationally convincing
character, as being asserted by an expert in a field of knowledge may create a presumption for
what is asserted? Zenker and Yu point out that the response-based principle does not identify a
clean-cut demarcation between responses which are disobedient and those that are impudent.
Failure to follow a directive is being disobedient. But, depending on who issued the directive, it
may also be impudent. So it seems that Goodwin’ proposal encounters her objection to the
activity criterion. Hence there are serious problems with Goodwin’ tripartite typology.
By contrast with Goodwin, Zenker and Yu favor the capacity-based principle. A type of
authority arises from a type of capacity–epistemic authority from knowledge, deontic authority
from socially conferred power deriving, for example, from one’s role in a social unit. One would
expect then that a typology of authorities would arise from a survey of types of power. This is
exactly how Zenker and Yu proceed, turning to historical accounts of sources of power. They
turn first to Locke. It might seem that Locke would regard dignity as a source of authority. If one
who for some cause, such as knowledge or power, has a “Reputation in the common esteem with
some kind of Authority,” then to question that authority is “thought a breach of Modesty”
(Nidditch, 1975 ed., Essay Concerning Human Understanding, p. 686, quoted on p. 13). Citing
the word of approved writers supports one’s point of view. Not to accept their testimony
constitutes impudence. Pace Goodwin, do these remarks show that the dignity requiring respect
constitutes an additional type of authority? Zenker and Yu argue that it does not. “Rather than be
constitutive of authority, dignity would mediate how an authority type plays out socially” (p. 14,
italics in original). Agents first possess epistemic or deontic authority, which then confers a
derivative dignity on them.
Locke claims that authority belongs to those held in common esteem because of their
“Parts (?), Learning, Eminency, Power, or some other Cause” (quoted on p. 13), suggesting four
types of authority. Zenker and Yu claim that we can re-interpret the list by reviewing the

typologies of authorities put forward by Aristotle, Cicero, and Boethius. The re-interpretation
yields a new typology of authorities, one more fine-grained than the epistemic versus deontic
distinction”(p. 18). Aristotle cites all, the majority, the wise or good, actual judges of the present
question or those whose authority is accepted by these judges, those whose judgment cannot be
rejected because they have complete control over the persons who must accept their judgments,
and finally those whom it would be unseemly to contradict, such as the gods. Following Zenker
and Yu, we may present this list of sources this way: all/majority, deontic sources including
judges of the present question and legal authorities, the wise or epistemic authorities, the good,
and those unseemly to oppose. The authors claim that support for their interpretation is found in
Cicero’s Topics, but I do not find this support in their discussion of Cicero. One point in this
connection is important for their typology. Cicero holds that people acknowledge as authorities
those they regard “as the kind of men they would like to be” (Topica, p. 78, quoted on p. 17).
Cicero thus recognizes that authorities enjoy a natural attractiveness to audiences” (p. 17). The
list should be extended then to include this type of authority. The concept of proportional
majority, which Zenker and Yu claim to be found in Boethius, gives explanation of what “parts”
can mean. The authority of parts is the authority of group majority (page 18) and is thus folded
into the first type. The authors reject sources unseemly to oppose as a separate authority source.
Their rationale: “All authority types entail that those who possess them enjoy some dignity”
(p.16). Is this last point true? A Nazi officer has authority to give commands, but where is the
officer’s dignity? By striking those unseemly to oppose as an authority source, the authors are
left with four: all/majority, deontic, wise or epistemic, and the good. I do not see any rationale
for their separating the wise from the good. But this may be due to the authors’ wanting to
incorporate the good into the attractive following Cicero, who sees virtue or the appearance of
virtue, including both moral and non-moral virtue such as “genius, industry and learning”
(Cicero, Topica, quoted on p. 17) making those with such virtues attractive, people wanting to be
like them.
In the last section of the paper, Zenker and Yu first list their four forms of authority–
epistemic, deontic, attractive, and majority. They then introduce two further ways to classify
authorities–source and mode, indicating that these distinctions are also part of their typology.
The source gives an authority its authority–knowledge for epistemic, power for deontic, traits
valued by an audience for the attractive form. Regarding majority, Zenker and Yu say it is
grounded “only in a larger proportion” (p. 19). To me, this is unclear, but I believe they mean
that majority authority is grounded in a majority of the audience favoring some standpoint. The
mode concerns whether the authority resides with an individual or a group. The authors conclude
presenting their typology by seeking to connect it with argument schemes via a further
distinction between assertive and directive speech acts. They introduce this speech act distinction
without discussion and claim without any argument that these are the only two speech acts
needed. Since the epistemic, deontic, and attractive forms have two modes of being commanded
and each of these six form/mode categories can be expressed by two speech acts, we now have
twelve subschemas. The majority scheme has only one mode but may be expressed by either
type of speech act. We now have fourteen sub-schemes. The authors now make a statement I find
obscure: The two modes “apply equally to individuals and collectives” (p. 20). So it seems that
in going from authority types to argument schemes, the mode distinction drops out completely.
They indicate that the source distinction can introduce further subcategories. Zenker and Yu
conclude their paper by “ringing the changes” on forms and speech acts correlating each of the
eight types with an argument scheme. However, it seems to me that the generation of these
argument schemes has been a combinatorial exercise rather than emerging from an examination

of concrete examples of these schemes. Furthermore, I find some of the types quite puzzling. For
example, what does it mean for a deontic or attractive authority to assert P and why should one
conclude from that to the correctness of P? Because of these problems, I fail to see how the
typology highlights issues in argument evaluation.
What of our two initial critical questions? Why do we need to recognize attractiveness
and group majority as sources of authority besides knowledge and power and are the reasons
adequate? Considering group majority first, Zenker and Yu cite a passage from Aristotle’s
Rhetoric for distinguishing all/majority, epistemic, and deontic sources of authority. What is the
rationale for recognizing majority as a distinct source of authority? Also, while knowledge gives
authority for making assertions and power for issuing directives, what does the majority licence?
If a majority accepts a given assertion sufficient for common knowledge, then in this
employment is not the majority an epistemic source? A candidate’s wining a majority in a given
election constrains the election authorities to declare the candidate a winner. This authority is
deontic. We need an example of majority authority which is not an instance of either epistemic
or deontic authority.
In discussing attractiveness in connection with discussing Cicero, Zenker and Yu claim
that since audiences regard as authorities those they regard as models of what they would like to
be, attractiveness is a source of authority. But could one object, as Kaszowy and Walton (2019,
289; see p. 14) object to the notion of dignity as a source of authority, that attractiveness fosters
recognition and respect of authorities and enhances the persuasive force of their assertives and
directives, rather than constituting a source in itself? Consequently, I fail to find that the authors
have given us a compelling reason for recognizing attractiveness and proportional majority as
separate sources of authority. As dignity is not a separate source of authority but rather
“functions as a social mechanism of commanding authority” (p. 14), attractiveness functions as a
social mechanism to draw attention to authority. Before proceeding with their promised future
research as well as addressing the issue of relating their typology to argument schemes, I hope
that Zenker and Yu will address these questions.

